

THE SOUTH JERSEY ECONOMIC REVIEW

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Buoyed by the opening of two new casino hotels last summer—Hard Rock and Ocean Resort—Atlantic City's economy added 4,600 jobs in 2018, an increase of 3.6 percent. Last year's rate of job growth in Atlantic City was its best since the late 1980s, a period that saw robust job creation tied to that decade's second wave of casino building. Employment in the metropolitan area's casino hotels increased by 3,500 (+17.8 percent) last year.¹

e increase was the gaming sector's largest (in absolute terms) since 1990—the year the Taj Mahal opened its doors.

While non-gaming related job growth was more modest last year it was relatively broad-based. Total employment excluding the gaming sector increased by 1,100—a 1 percent increase. (Table 1) e acceleration in regional homebuilding (see discussion below), in tandem with other major construction

Table 1: Atlantic City Establishment (Payroll) Employment by Industry (2											
	Employm	Absolute Change from Prior Year				Percent Change from Prior Year					
Industry/Sector	2014 2015	2016 201	7 2018	2015	2016	2017	2018	2015	2016	2017	2018
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.											


Re ecting last year's solid job growth, the metropolitan area's unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent from 7.2 percent in 2017. Importantly, last year's decline in the unemployment rate came despite a modest increase in the local labor force of 0.5 percent. In fact, last year's increase in the local labor force was the rst since 2012. Re ecting the aftermath of the Great Recession and the deep and protracted retrenchment in the local gaming sector, the local economy's labor force declined by nearly 20,000 (-14 percent) between 2012 and 2017.

Housing Market

As Figure 3 shows, single-family home prices in the metropolitan area declined by 36 percent between mid-2006 and early 2017.

e decline in single-family home prices in Atlantic City was among the largest and most protracted in the nation. Home prices began to stabilize in early 2017. Since then, prices have increased by approximately 7 percent.

e e ect of the collapse in home prices is visible in Figure 4, which shows permit activity for single-family homebuilding in the metropolitan area. Single-family homebuilding in Atlantic City declined signi cantly beginning in 2006 in tandem with the national housing market downturn.



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Activity remained largely dormant until mid-2015. Homebuilding began to recover thereafter before slowing markedly again in late 2016 and early 2017. Since early 2017, permit activity has slowly gathered pace. In October 2018, the six-month moving average of permits (which captures the number of single-family units authorized by permits pulled by homebuilders) climbed to 104—a level last seen in early 2007.


Atlantic City Gaming

One key question that will hang over the Atlantic City metropolitan area economy as 2019 unfolds is whether the momentum the local gaming sector gained via the two new casino openings in 2018 can be sustained. While last summer's casino openings added jobs to the local economy, they also added signi cant new inventory (e.g., the industry's hotel room inventory increased by 28.5 percent) and competition to the local market. In addition to these openings and their localized e ects on gaming operators and the industry's total employment, another

key consideration regards the longer-run implications of sports wagering and internet casino gambling on Atlantic City's gaming sector. In the special feature that follows, long-time gaming industry analyst and former adjunct instructor at Stockton University, Anthony Marino, assesses the economic potential these newest forms of gaming hold for Atlantic City's gaming industry.







The Atlantic City casino industry changed significantly in the second half of 2018. In late June, the simultaneous opening of two new casinos and the advent of legal sports wagering operations sparked a surge in employment numbers, visitor trips to the resort, and gaming revenues.

Brick and mortar casino gambling revenues for all of 2018 increased to \$2.511 billion dollars from the 2017 level of \$2.413 billion. Sports wagering, which commenced in mid-June, added another \$50.2 million dollars to total gaming revenue while the industry's third revenue producing component, internet casino gambling, won \$298.7 million dollars. us, full year gaming win in 2018 totaled \$2.860 billion dollars, a robust +7.5% increase over 2017 revenues of \$2.659 billion dollars. (See Table 2)

Internet gambling and sports wagering revenue trends merit close scrutiny for two reasons: they supplement brick and mortar gambling but may reduce future visitation to Atlantic City, thereby threatening traditional brick and mortar gaming and non-gaming revenues. Table 2 includes completed data from 2006, 2012, 2017, and data currently available

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for 2018 to suggest how both internal and external competition have a ected land-based casino revenue and casino employee numbers in the last 12 years.

The rapid rise of internet casino gambling. e New Jersey Legislature and state gambling regulators fast-tracked the introduction of internet gambling ahead of most nearby east coast states. It became available in November 2013 and generated nearly \$8.4 million dollars in gaming win by year's end.

Internet gambling came too late to save four of the then 12 casinos from closing during 2014. Nonetheless, internet revenues were \$122.9 million dollars that year. In 2015, internet gambling increased 21.2%, to \$148.9 million compared to 2014; it jumped another 32.1% in 2016 to \$196.7 million dollars, and again by 24.9% in 2017 to \$245.6 million dollars. As shown in Table 2, in 2018, internet gambling win reached \$298.7 million dollars.

Will sports wagering follow a similar growth pattern? Total New Jersey sports wagering handle (amount bet, not amount won), including both Atlantic City casino and two racetrack sports, books totaled \$1.247 billion dollars (in just six months) in 2018. But two of the nine casinos did not operate sports books in 2018, and others initiated activities late in the year.

e Hard Rock casino will open its sports book in early 2019 while Caesars casino in the resort apparently plans to continue sending its customers to its next-door neighbor's jointly owned sports book at Bally's. All three Atlantic City casinos owned by Caesars Entertainment (Caesars, Bally's, and Harrah's), as well as the Borgata, owned by MGWabdolla-8 (ts book at) je spo10 ll H 32.1% Hinteros

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in online gambling generated signi cant upward momentum in total industry gross gaming revenues. However, data also show brick and mortar gaming revenues declined at six of the seven former operators in the second half of last year. Upsizing from seven to nine operators increased city-wide visits but apparently not enough to bene t all casinos. Complete 2018 annual nancial reports for individual casinos are due in March. ose reports will provide additional insight into the impact of yet unreported costs on Net Revenues, Gross Operating Pro ts, and Net Income.

Questions not yet answered. Internet gambling and online sports wagering o er gaming operators the opportunity to reduce personnel and other costs associated with brick and mortar gambling. Online gambling may reduce sta ng levels and render less critical the number of food, beverage, and retail outlets, even hotel rooms in generating gaming revenue. Promotional allowances and costs, plus room and food comps deployed to attract visits to land-based facilities to "incentivize" gambling, may not be as necessary in the

future, thereby increasing pro t margins for gaming operators.

An early sign of this possible long-term trend is that the two smallest Atlantic City casinos (on the basis of rooms and non-gaming amenities) have done extremely well in recent years. Both the Golden Nugget and Resorts plunged early into internet gambling and sports wagering. In 2018, Golden Nugget racked up a \$104.8-million-dollar win from internet gambling, nearly doubling runner-up Borgata's amount of \$54.1 million, while capturing 35 percent of the resort's total internet market. Resorts Digital accounted for \$30.4 of Atlantic City's \$50.2 million sports wagering revenue, a 61 percent market share.

Some assume the addition of on-site sports books ensures more visits to Atlantic City. Perhaps they did in 2018 while still a novelty. But more than \$35 million dollars of Atlantic City's sports wagering win last year was actually bet online rather than at onsite kiosks or teller windows. e percentage of online wagers is likely to grow to perhaps 75 percent or more in the next two years as players adapt to mobile app wagering.

e bene ts of boosting revenues while reducing costs through online betting and sports wagering might be counterbalanced by their potential adverse impact on visitation to the resort, thereby depressing brick and mortar gambling and non-gaming revenues not only in casinos but at all city tourism venues. Moreover, a recent Department of Justice interpretive statement of the federal Wire Act threatens a government move to declare illegal any payments across state lines of gambling bets even if made legally within New Jersey or other states.

Certainly 2018 was an excellent year for the region's tourism economy. Final data, however, will likely show that many of the nine casinos experienced decreased gross operating pro ts. If accelerating movement towards online sports wagering, internet gambling, and erce external competition result in less future visitation, individual casino decreases in brick and mortar revenues, and falling employment levels, the current tourism industry boom may be short-lived.

e Ocean City metropolitan area—which is coincident with Cape May County—saw its best job growth since 2004 last year. Total employment in the metropolitan area economy increased by 1,400 jobs—a 3.2 percent increase. Importantly, last year's job growth in Cape May occurred outside its key leisure and hospitality sector, which

Ocean City Economic Update and Outlook

experienced a job decline of 700 (-5.4 us, employment in nonpercent). leisure and hospitality sectors increased by 2,100 (+6.6 percent). While payroll data limitations preclude full identi cation of the industries that experienced job growth last year, alternative data sources (rst quarter data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, which is based on administrative data from the state's unemployment system) suggests that much of it occurred in professional and business services, education and health services, and local government.

Last year's job growth—which pushed total establishment employment to 45,000—allowed total employment in the metropolitan area to nally surpass its pre-Great Recession 2005 cyclical peak of 44,600. Between 2005 and 2011, the metropolitan area lost 3,800

jobs (-9 percent). Since bottoming out in 2011, employment has risen by 4,300 (+10 percent).

Re ecting last year's job growth, Ocean City's unemployment rate fell to 8.5 percent last year from 9.2 percent the prior year. Importantly, last year's decline in the unemployment rate (unlike the prior year's) came despite an increase in the local labor force which grew a modest 0.8 percent (+394 participants).

Despite the overall job decline in Cape May's leisure and hospitality sector in 2018, hotel/motel sales tax data suggest that last summer's shore season was solid. During the summer months, sales tax collections in Cape May County were up 4.7% year-on-year (compared to rates of growth of 2.4% in 2017 and 3.4% in 2016). Sales tax collections were up 3.3% year-on-year thru September 2018 (compared to rates of growth of 2.9% in 2017 and 2.7% in 2016). Toll transactions through the Egg Harbor Toll Plaza also indicate that last year's

summer shore season was good. Total toll transactions last summer were up 4.6% year-on-year (compared to growth of 2.7% in 2017, and a decline of 2.4% in 2016).

Single-family home prices in Ocean City rose 3.6 percent in 2018, according to Freddie Mac's single-family home price index. Between 2006 and 2014, single-family home prices in the metropolitan area declined by 22 percent. Since bottoming out, home prices have climbed 10.7 percent.

Looking ahead, Ocean City's economic fortunes in 2019 will be heavily dependent upon healthy consumers and the national interest rate climate. More than one-third of the metropolitan area's real GDP is tied to real estate and rental/leasing activity, compared to a U.S. metropolitan area benchmark of 14 percent. is gure not only re ects summer shore vacation rentals, but equally, second/vacation home buying. e latter tends to be rather

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interest-rate sensitive. In addition to real estate, 11 percent of Ocean City's real GDP is tied to the leisure and hospitality industry (compared to 4 percent nationally), while another 8.5 percent is tied to retail trade activity (compared to a national benchmark of 6 percent). us, all told, well over half of the metropolitan area's annual economic output is tied to highly discretionary consumer spending on entertainment, vacationing, real-estate investing and transactions.

Such statistics underscore the importance of consumers and interest rates for Ocean City's economy. Should consumers elect to dial back their spending in 2019 amid increasing worries over the state of the national economy, or were the Fed to continue to move more aggressively on the interest rate front than its most recent public remarks suggest it might, Ocean City's economy will likely see a slowdown in 2019. In fact, despite steady growth in consumer spending over the past few years at the national level, wage growth has been more modest. Last year's

robust consumer credit growth re ects this dynamic.

Equally, while Cape May's economy is not driven by the greater Atlantic City economy, it remains true that it bene ts from its northern neighbor's tourism tra c. us, another wildcard for Cape May in 2019 will be the health of Atlantic City's economy—especially its gaming sector.

Stockton's Long-Run Impact on Atlantic City's Economy

Among the most important developments that will play a role in shaping Atlantic City's economic fortunes over the coming decades is the opening last fall of Stockton University Atlantic City in the city's historic Chelsea neighborhood. Stockton's arrival (or, more accurately, return) to Atlantic City has understandably generated signi cant hope in Atlantic City. After years of signi cant economic dislocation and distress tied to the aftermath of the national housing crisis and Great Recession, and a deep localized casinoindustry retrenchment, the university's new campus should make important contributions to the local economy in the years ahead.

How signi cant will Stockton's impact on the seaside resort's longer-term economic fortunes be? To shed some light on this question, I analyze three communities that experienced new university/college openings within the recent past: Nevada State College (NSC) in Henderson in 2002: the University of California Merced in 2005; and, Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC) in Lawrenceville in e history and details underlying each institution's opening were of course unique. And, their respective trajectories since opening have also been di erent. us, drawing out generalizations that might be used to forecast Stockton's longer-term impact on the City of Atlantic City is di cult. Perhaps most importantly, these three openings created new institutions of higher education. While Stockton Atlantic City required extensive public and private coordination and construction (just as these three institutions

did), it did not birth a new institution of higher education. us, the analysis developed here is perhaps best interpreted as providing a framework upon which additional assessments and projections about Stockton's long-run impact on the City of Atlantic City can be grafted. Before discussing these three openings, I brie y outline the impacts that universities and colleges often have on their surrounding communities and local economies. Broadly speaking, such institutions' operations—as opposed to their physical construction, which positively a ects things like construction employment in the short-run-generate several distinct (and, often overlapping) economic e ects on their surrounding communities.

Foot-traffic. To the extent that university and college campuses lay in close physical proximity to their host communities' central business districts, their foot-tra c (by students, sta, faculty, guests, and others) can translate into vital support for local (often small) businesses. Such tra c can be especially important if it enhances demand for businesses that traditionally rely heavily upon day-time and/or work-week tra c, e.g., restaurants' and convenience stores' morning and lunch-time rushes. University populations can often extend the usual 9-5 work week for many businesses located near a campus.

Real Estate. In the absence of an adequate supply of on-campus housing for students, universities and colleges can also signi cantly impact local real estate markets—especially the multi-family (apartment) market. Indeed, a decision to rely upon private sector provisioning of apartments and housing options for students and faculty can have a signi cant impact on the development of local real estate. is impact on real estate is independent of (though often closely tied to) universities' and colleges' own demand for real estate.

Educational Attainment. Institutions of higher education can (perhaps most obviously) often raise the educational attainment of their local population. While several factors in uence the signi cance of this impact—especially the post-graduation residency decisions of graduates—many institutions of higher education's student

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Community Engagement. Many universities and colleges engage in extensive community engagement-related work. Internships, volunteerism, service-learning, experiential education, and community partnerships provide signi cant bene ts to institutions of higher education and their host communities. While the ability to place an economic value on such engagement is often di cult (owing to its non-market status), there is little doubt that the value of such activities may be signi cant.

Diversification and Commercial Development. Universities and colleges can play an important role in diversifying a local economy. Such diversi cation has two dimensions. First, signi cant institutional growth over the long-run-which, above all, means growing enrollment, faculty, and sta, and procurement expenditures—can foster greater demand for a host of goods and services across a range of industries. including, among others, retail and wholesale trade, professional and business services, nancial activities, leisure and hospitality, and other services. Such increases in demand can quickly mushroom in cases where an anchor educational institution serves as a magnet for the establishment of new businesses, business relocations (say, to a university district), or branch openings of existing businesses.

Broadly speaking, the extent of this type of industrial diversi cation will hinge upon the relationship between the educational institution's size and its host community's economy. Most obviously, such diversi cation might be expected to be rather signi cant given a large educational institution and a relatively small local economy. It may be far less signi cant in the opposite case.

e second diversi cation dimension relates to the research and development activities of higher educational institutions. ere is a long and well-documented history of such institutional activities that have spawned entirely new products and industries. Perhaps the most famous example is Stanford University's role in the development of its renowned Industrial Park in the 1950s. e same time, city-based data can be leveraged to get some sense of how these three institutions of higher education have a ected their local host communities and economies along many of these other impact dimensions.

As Table 3 shows, the City of Merced's population totaled 65,000 in 2005. By 2017, it had grown 27 percent to 83,000. Over the same period, UC Merced's enrollment grew from 875 to 7,400.

us, by 2017, the university's enrollment was equal to nearly 9 percent of the City of Merced's population. Nearly all the university's students live on campus and are therefore (owing to U.S. Census Bureau population estimation protocols) counted as residents of the city. Henderson's population grew from 175,000 in 2000 to 302,000 by 2017—a rather remarkable 72.5 percent increase that re ects its proximity to Las Vegas, which has consistently been among the fastest-growing metropolitan areas in the U.S. for several decades. Over the same period, NSC's enrollment climbed from 177 to 4,200. us, by 2017, the college's enrollment was equal to 1.4 percent of the city's population. However, because NSC has yet to develop on-campus housing, it is impossible (as in the UC Merced case) to determine the relationship between its enrollment and the city's population. Lawrenceville's population increased to nearly 30,000 in 2017 from 26,900 in 2006.

University of California, Merced

Lying 115 miles east of San Jose, the City of Merced is the county seat of Merced County, which comprises the Merced, CA metropolitan statistical area. Merced, along with its neighboring metropolitan areas, Fresno and Modesto, lies along the northsouth State Route 99 corridor that winds its way through the greater San Joaquin Valley. Merced lies 40 miles southeast of Modesto, and 57 miles northwest of Fresno. 815-acre campus lies adjacent to Yosemite Lake approximately 8 miles northeast of downtown Merced. UC Merced welcomed its rst undergraduate class in the fall of 2005. Enrollment has grown from an inaugural undergraduate class of 875 to nearly 7,400 students today (including nearly 600 graduate students). Approximately 72 percent of UC Merced's rst-year students are rst-generation college students. e campus' faculty and administration total more than 1,500. Academic programs include engineering, natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities and arts.

Nevada State College (NSC)

Located in the southern foothills of Henderson, NV (13 miles southeast of downtown Las Vegas), Nevada State opened its doors in the fall of 2002 as the state's rst state college. Today, its 509-acre campus (which lies six miles southeast of downtown Henderson) enrolls approximately 4,200 undergraduates (compared to an inaugural class of 177). Sixtyone percent of students are rst-generation college students. Faculty and sta number 175.

e college o ers a range of degrees across its schools of education, nursing, and liberal arts and sciences.

Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC)

Georgia Gwinnett College is located in Lawrenceville, GA which lies 30 miles northeast of downtown Atlanta. GGC opened its doors on August 18, 2006, as the rst four-year public institution created in Georgia in more than 100 years. Today, the college's 260-acrea campus, which lies seven miles northwest of downtown Lawrenceville, enrolls more than 12,000 undergraduate students (compared to an inaugural class of 118). Forty percent of students are rst-generation college e college o ers degrees in students. business, education, health sciences, liberal arts, sciences and technology.

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	UC Merced (2005) Merced, CA			Neveda State College (2002) Henderson, NV			Georgia Gwinnett College (2006) Lawrenceville, GA		
	2005	2017	% Change	2002	2017	% Change	2006	2017	% Change
University/College Enrollment	875	7,400		177	4,200		118	12,000	
City's Population	65,391	83,100	27.1%	175,381*	302,535	72.5%	26,878	29,873	11.1%

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Among the most interesting indicators shown in Table 3 is educational attainment. As shown, the increase in the share of the City of Merced's 18-24 age cohort that holds a BA degree or higher has risen signi cantly since UC Merced's opening. In 2005, just 1.4 percent of this cohort held a BA degree or higher. By 2017, this share had jumped to 7.7 percent. is share also increased in Henderson from 6.3 percent to 7.7 percent. And, while it declined in Lawrenceville by 1.6 percentage points, it increased to 10.5 percent (from 9.2 percent) in greater Gwinnett County, wherein Lawrenceville and GGC lay. e share of the City of Atlantic City's 18-24 age cohort that held a BA degree or higher was 3.5 percent in 2012-2017. (is share equaled 8.8 percent in Atlantic County, NJ.) Based on these data, it seems reasonable to expect that one of the Stockton AC campus's chief contributions to the local economy in the years ahead will be to increase the educational attainment of this age cohort in the City of Atlantic City.

What are the larger implications of the foregoing discussion and analysis? As noted, each of these institutions' openings and subsequent trajectories have been unique—just as Stockton Atlantic City's will be. is fact limits the ability to forecast Stockton's long-run impact on the City of Atlantic City. Nevertheless, the analysis here appears to provide at least two important takehomes. First, it seems clear that new colleges and universities can—via their procurement, foot-tra c, real estate needs, and community engagement—can play important roles in supporting their local host economies and

communities. In additional to these direct impacts, their anchor status can also help stabilize their immediate neighborhoods and attract new businesses. Last fall's opening of AtlantiCare's rst Atlantic City-based Urgent Care Center on the Stockton AC site is emblematic of this type of magnet e ect.

At the same time, these three openings also make clear (given their multi-year histories) that such institutions will not quickly nor radically transform their local economies. In some sense, this should not be surprising. Despite their size and scale, such institutions remain relatively small in the context of their larger host local economies. For example, despite UC Merced's obvious heft as an anchor institution in the San Joaquin Valley, one that supports 7,400 students and nearly 1,500 sta, its total expenditures (as noted) account for just 2.6 percent of the Merced metropolitan area's total personal income.4 Were Stockton Atlantic City (alone) to yield an equivalent impact, its expenditures would have to equal \$327 million or 1.5 times its 2015 Galloway campus expenditures. Now, of course, once one considers the city level (as opposed to the metropolitan level), this changes somewhat. It remains true that the City of Atlantic City's economy accounts for the lion's share of the greater Atlantic City metropolitan area economy (largely owing to the casino industry). It is also true that Stockton Atlantic City's impact on the local city economy may be larger than these other institutions' due to the fact the it sits in the city's business district (unlike the three other campuses that lies several miles from their host cities' downtown areas).

Still, based on these three case studies, it seems far-fetched to imagine that Stockton Atlantic City will drive signi cant

outperformance in the Atlantic City economy. Well over a decade has passed since UC Merced's opening. And, despite its heft as an anchor institution and obvious positive impact on the local economy, its presence in Merced has not been transformative in terms of generating extensive industrial diversi cation nor delivering signi cant economic outperformance to the greater Merced metropolitan area (nor even the City of Merced, whose 16+ employment base has grown just 5 percent since UC Merced opened its doors). e message here should not be misinterpreted. UC Merced, along with NSC and GGC have clearly had signi cant positive impacts on their host communities and their economies. Indeed, the relevant (though purely hypothetical) local economic development question is not whether these institutions have generated signi cant diversi cation or outperformance. Rather, it is what these communities' economic experiences would have been in the absence of these institutions.

Most importantly, and perhaps also least surprisingly, these institutions' largest contribution to their respective communities to date appears to have been their central roles in elevating the educational attainment of their communities' populations. Despite the understandable interest in Stockton's role in the economic revitalization of Atlantic City and its economy in the nearterm, those contributions (whatever they may be) will, in the long-run, be dwarfed by the far more signi cant educational ones it delivers to those who walk through its doors.

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